October 29, 1998
Grady L. Hunt Locklear, Jacobs & Hunt 203 South Vance Street
P.O. Box 999 Pembroke, NC 28372
Re: Advisory Opinion; Finance Officer Serving at Pleasure of Superintendent; G.S. § 115C- 435
Dear Mr. Hunt:
On behalf of the Robeson County Board of Education, you have written to ask whether the superintendent of schools has the authority to dismiss a school finance officer without the approval of the board of education.
G.S. § 115C-435 provides in pertinent part: "Each local school administrative unit shall have a school finance officer who shall be appointed or designated by the superintendent of schools and approved by the board of education, with the school finance officer serving at the pleasure of the superintendent." (Emphasis added). The authority granted the superintendent over the employment of the school finance officer is not uncommon. My search of the General Statutes revealed over a hundred different statutes that provide that a state or local official is to serve at the pleasure of another state or local official.
In Harrell v. Whisenant, 53 N.C. App. 615, 281 S.E.2d 453 (1981), the Court of Appeals held that a provision in a city code which provided that the chief of police was "to serve at the pleasure of the city manager" would be meaningless if the exercise of the manager’s "pleasure" were subjected to other provisions of the city code giving permanent employees the right to appeal decisions to terminate their employment. In the Court of Appeals opinion, legislative intent controlled its decision. The Court found that there was no evidence that the city intended to preclude the dismissal of the chief of police at the city manager’s pleasure, when it granted procedural and substantive protections to subordinate employees.
I believe that the Court of Appeals holding in Harrell is applicable to G.S. § 115C-435. In light of the superintendent’s express statutory authority and the fact that the General Assembly has frequently granted similar authority to other state officials, it is my opinion that when the General Assembly enacted G.S. § 115C-435 it did so with the intent to grant the superintendent unbridled authority to dismiss the school finance officer for any reason or no reason at all, provided it was not an illegal reason. The General Assembly did not intend the superintendent’s decision to be subject to board of education approval or review. Moreover, for reasons stated by the Court in Harrell, it is also my opinion that a dismissed school finance officer has no right to appeal the superintendent’s decision to dismiss him to the local board of education under G.S. § 115C-45.
signed by:
Grayson G. Kelley Senior Deputy Attorney General
Thomas J. Ziko
Special Deputy Attorney General