



March 23, 2026

Donald J. Trump

The President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Mr. President:

As you know, the fentanyl crisis continues to devastate communities across the United States by leaving families shattered and claiming tens of thousands of American lives each year. The transnational drug trade fueling this epidemic relies heavily on sophisticated money laundering networks. Increasingly, strong evidence indicates that WeChat Messenger and its China-based sister app, Weixin (collectively, "WeChat"), serve as the central financial conduits for a plethora of these illicit operations.

With over a billion users worldwide, WeChat's peer-to-peer messaging platform has been widely co-opted by cartels and their financial facilitators. A 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment found that WeChat's encrypted messaging makes it a "key method used to communicate the transfer of funds among various participants" in Chinese money laundering schemes.¹ Additionally, one DEA agent recently testified regarding the laundering of fentanyl proceeds: "It is all happening on WeChat... The launderers are not concealing themselves on WeChat."²

Last year, a bipartisan group of Attorneys General outlined this urgent threat to Tencent, the parent company of both WeChat Messenger and Weixin. Through extensive discussions, we secured commitments from the Singapore-based WeChat Messenger to improve cooperation with U.S. law enforcement regarding American users suspected of criminal activity.

However, it is now clear these measures are insufficient because both companies firmly resisted sharing critical data regarding Chinese users with American law enforcement.

In practice, this means that law enforcement can only see one side of illegal transactions, shielding Chinese-based users from justice. WeChat's international Messenger users and Weixin users based in China seamlessly interact on what is functionally the same platform. While WeChat Messenger claims it will comply with U.S. legal processes under Singaporean law, it claims that it cannot provide data on the Weixin users who are communicating with American suspects, citing Chinese legal restrictions. Furthermore, Weixin claims that China's International Criminal Justice Assistance Law explicitly prohibits them from cooperating with U.S. law enforcement.

¹ *National Money Laundering Risk Assessment*, U.S. Treasury Dep't 24 (2022),

<https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2022-National-Money-Laundering-Risk-Assessment.pdf>

² Kristen Berg & Sebastian Rotella, *The Gangster Who Changed Money Laundering*, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 11, 2022, 5:00 AM), <https://www.propublica.org/article/china-cartels-xizhi-li-money-laundering>.

These dynamics actively thwart our ability to disrupt and dismantle the international drug organizations poisoning our communities. These jurisdictional obstacles are deadly, untenable, and must be addressed.

We urge your administration to elevate this issue to a national security priority and directly integrate it into your discussions with the Chinese government. The refusal of the Chinese government to allow its corporate entities to comply with valid American legal processes demands a firm response.

Our local, state, and federal law enforcement partners are fighting every day to stop the flow of fentanyl. If the Chinese government will not act to stop its platforms from facilitating fentanyl trafficking, the United States must take immediate action.

Sincerely,



Jeff Jackson
North Carolina Attorney General



Alan Wilson
South Carolina Attorney General



Phil Weiser
Colorado Attorney General



Russell Coleman
Kentucky Attorney General



John M. Formella
New Hampshire Attorney General



Jennifer Davenport
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