March 3, 1981
Subject:
Motor Vehicles; Limited Driving Privilege; Prior Conviction.
Requested By:
James W. Copeland, Jr. Assistant District Attorney Eighth Judicial District
Question:
Does G.S. 20-179(b)(1) prohibit the issuance of a limited driving privilege if the defendant has a prior conviction of G.S. 20-138 or G.S. 20-139 within the preceding seven years?
Conclusion:
Yes.
G.S. 20-179(b) was amended twice by the 1979 General Assembly. On May 29, 1979, it ratified Senate Bill 273, found in Chapter 667 of the 1979 Session Laws, which provided for the classified driver’s license. Section 34 of Chapter 667 specifically amended G.S. 20-179(b)(1) by striking references to "operator’s or chauffeur’s licenses" and inserting "driver’s license". The act amended the 1977 statute which contained the ten year proviso in determining eligibility for a limited privilege. This amendment was to become effective January 1, 1981.
On June 8, 1979, Senate Bill 691 was ratified. This act also amended the 1977 statute by completely rewriting G.S. 20-179(b) and is found as Chapter 903 in the 1979 Session Laws. The act had an effective date of January 1, 1980. Along with establishing the Alcohol and Drug Education Traffic School, this act reduced the ten year period to seven years for purposes of determining whether the conviction is a first conviction in order to qualify for a limited privilege.
As Chapter 903 had an effective date of January 1, 1980, the rewritten statute appears in the 1980 Interim Supplement to the General Statutes, but without the amendments made by Chapter 667, Section 34, not effective until January 1, 1981. The editor’s note following the statute contains those amendments, but as they changed the 1977 statute, the old statutory language appears.
"The cardinal principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature is controlling." State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 520, 243 S.E. 2d 338 (1978), and cases cited therein. The legislative intent ". . . is to be ascertained by appropriate means and indicia, such as the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means . . ." State v. Partlow, 91 N.C. 550, 552 (1884).
Applying these principles of statutory construction, it is clear the intent of Section 34, Chapter 667 was to insert appropriate references to the new classified driver’s license system wherever "operator or chauffeur" appeared in G.S. 20-179(b)(1). The intent of Chapter 903 was to rewrite G.S.20-179(b) as a whole. This act established the Alcohol and Drug Education Traffic School and made it a condition of the limited privilege, with limited exceptions. To accept the position that Chapter 667 amends Chapter 903 would mean the school would be eliminated and the law would revert to its 1977 wording, except that it would refer to "driver’s" license instead of "operator or chauffeur". The most consistent interpretation is that the rewrite of G.S. 20-179(b) as found in Chapter 903 reflects the intent of the Legislature and that the effect of Chapter 667, Section 34 is simply to delete "operator’s or chauffeur’s" as found in the third and fourth paragraphs of G.S. 20-179(b)(1) and insert "driver’s" in lieu thereof as of January 1, 1981. As a result, the seven year period as provided in Chapter 903 remains in effect for purposes of determining eligibility for a limited permit.
Rufus L. Edmisten Attorney General
William W. Melvin Deputy Attorney General
Jane P. Gray Associate Attorney