March 15, 1984
Subject:
Statutory construction.
Requested By:
Terrence D. Sullivan Director Legislative Research General Assembly
Question:
Did Chapter 5 of the Extra Session of 1984 place all of Vance County in Senatorial District 11?
Conclusion:
Yes.
Senate Bill 1 of the Extra Session of 1984, as introduced, divided Vance County between Senatorial District 2 and Senatorial District 11. District 2 was to include Middleburg-Nutbush, Townsville and Williamsboro Townships, and District 11 was to include Dabney, Henderson, Kittrell, Sandy Creek and Watkins Townships.
An amendment by the Senate to the provisions relating to District 11 placed all of Vance County in District 11, however, no amendment relating to Vance County was made to the provisions regarding District 2. Therefore as enacted Chapter 5 of the Session Laws for the 1984 Extra Session has contradictory language that places all of Vance County in District 11 and that places parts of Vance County in District 2.
"It is settled law that a statute must be construed as written. State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 158
S.E. 2d 37 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 1028; In re Duckett, 271 N.C. 430, 156 S.E. 2d 838 (1967). However, where a statute is ambiguous, resort must be had to judicial construction to ascertain the legislative will. Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797 (1948). The courts will control the language to give effect to the legislative intent. Ikerd v. R.R., 209 N.C. 270, 183 S.E. 402 (1936). Where a statute must be construed to carry out the legislative intent, that intent must be found from the language of the act, its legislative history and circumstances surrounding its adoption which will throw light upon the evil sought to be remedied. Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 154 S.E.2d 548 (1967); D & W, Inc. v. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 151 S.E. 2d 241 (1966)." Variety Theatres v. Cleveland County, 15 N.C. App. 512, 513, 514 (1972).
The legislative history of Senate Bill 1, i.e., the amendment to the language regarding District 11, makes it clear that the legislative intent was to place all of Vance County in District 11. Because the legislative intent in regard to the make up of District 11 is so clear that it is equally clear that the contradictory language regarding District 2 was inadvertently left in the act. Because the intent is so clear the language regarding District 2 can be treated as surplusage. Ikerd v. North Carolina R. Co., 209 N.C. 270, 183 S.E. 402 (1936).
"The object of all interpretation is to determine the intent of the law-making body. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative statement. The heart of a statute is the intention of the lawmaking body. Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N.C. 268; S. v. Earnhardt, 170 N.C. 725. In the language of Chancellor Kent: "In the exposition of a statute the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms, and its reason and intention will prevail over the literal sense of the terms, and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict letter. When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the remedy in view, and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion." I Kent Com., 461.
Clerical errors, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute unmeaning or nonsensical, or would defeat its intended operation, will not vitiate the act. They will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true reading is obvious and the real meaning of the Legislature is apparent on the face of the whole enactment. Black Int. Laws, p. 157." State v. Humphries, 210 N.C. 406, 410, 186 S.E. 402.
Therefore, Chapter 5 of the 1984 Extra Session can be read as if the words placing part of Vance County in District 2 had been deleted.
RUFUS L. EDMISTEN ATTORNEY GENERAL
Charles J. Murray Special Deputy Attorney General Revisor of Statutes