January 16, 1998
Mark D. Selph, Secretary-Treasurer
- N.C.
- Licensing Board for General Contractors
- P.
- O. Box 17187 Raleigh, NC 27619
RE: Advisory Opinion; General Contractors; Homeowners Recovery Fund; N.C.G.S. § 87-15.5
Dear Mr. Selph:
You ask whether a homeowner who has suffered a monetary loss and has filed an application for reimbursement from the Homeowners Recovery Fund established pursuant to Article 1A of Chapter 87 of the General Statutes is entitled to any recovery from the Fund if he has received any monetary payment, regardless of amount, from the general contractor responsible for the loss.
For reasons which follow, it is our opinion that no payment may be made from the Fund to any applicant who has received any monetary payment from the general contractor responsible for the loss.
The Homeowners Recovery Fund was established "to reimburse homeowners who have suffered a reimbursable loss in constructing or altering a single-family residential dwelling unit."
N.C.G.S. § 87-15.6(a). A reimbursable loss is defined in N.C.G.S. § 87-15.5(6) as follows:
Reimbursable loss. — A monetary loss that meets all of the following requirements:
- a.
- Results from dishonest or incompetent conduct by a general contractor in constructing or altering a single-family residential dwelling unit.
- b.
- Is not paid, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of the general contractor whose conduct caused the loss.
- c.
- Is not covered by a bond, a surety agreement, or an insurance contract.
A reimbursable loss, therefore, is a monetary loss that, among other things, "is not paid, in whole or in part, by or on behalf of the general contractor whose conduct caused the loss." N.C.G.S. § 87-15.5(6)b. When construing the meaning of a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the cardinal rule of construction is that the intent of the Legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. Housing Authority of Greensboro v. Farabee, 284 N.C. 242 (1973). Moreover, it is presumed that the Legislature comprehended the import of the words employed by it to express its intent. Henry v. Leather Company, 234 N.C. 126 (1951). Where the words of a statute have not acquired a technical meaning, they must be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning unless a different meaning is apparent or clearly indicated by the context of the statute. Lafayette Transp. Service, Inc. v. County of Robeson, 283 N.C. 494 (1973).
The question is, therefore, what was the intent of the Legislature when it prohibited an applicant from recovering anything from the Fund if the applicant was paid "in whole or in part" by the general contractor whose conduct caused the loss? Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (1987 Edition) defines the term "in whole" as follows: "to the full or entire extent." That same dictionary defines the word "part" as "something less than the whole." It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature intended that a person who receives any monetary payment from the contractor whose conduct caused the loss, no matter how small that payment might be, would not be entitled to any reimbursement from the Fund.
signed by:
Andrew A. Vanore, Jr.
Chief Deputy Attorney General