Youth Services; Limits on Periods of Commitment to Division Youth Services

Subject:

Requested By: Sarah T. Morrow, Secretary Department of Human Resources

Questions: Does G.S. 7A-652(c) apply to juveniles who were committed to the Division of Youth Services prior to January 1, 1980, and whose cases are not pending on appeal?

 

1.  
2. When the committing judge in a juvenile proceeding predicates a finding of delinquency upon several actions by the juvenile which would be crimes if perpetrated by an adult, in considering the maximum time that the juvenile may be retained at a treatment facility under G.S. 7A-652(c), is the Division of Youth Services automatically bound by the period of confinement that an adult would have received under concurrent sentencing?

    

Conclusions: No.

 

1.  
2. No.

    

G.S. 7A-652 which became effective on January 1, 1980, provides in part as follows:

"§ 7A-652. Commitment of delinquent juvenile to Division of Youth Services. – (a) A delinquent juvenile 10 years of age or more may be committed to the Division of Youth Services for placement in one of the residential facilities operated by the Division if the judge finds that the alternatives to commitment as contained in G.S. 7A-649 have been attempted unsuccessfully or are inappropriate and that the juvenile’s behavior constitutes a threat to persons or property in the community.

(b)

Commitment shall be for:

(1)

An indefinite term not to exceed the eighteenth birthday of the juvenile; or

(2)

A definite term not to exceed two years if the judge finds that the juvenile is 14 years of age or older, has been previously adjudicated delinquent for two or more felony offenses, and has been previously committed to a residential facility operated by the Division of Youth Services. The Division may reduce the duration of the definite commitment by an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent (25%) if the juvenile has not committed any major infractions of the regulations of any facility to which he is assigned, and the division of Youth Services may move for a reduction of more than twenty-five percent (25%) pursuant to G.S. 7A-664.

(c)

In no event shall commitment be for a period of time in excess of that period for which an adult could be committed."

Examination of the new North Carolina Juvenile Code, of which these statutory provisions are a part, reveals several significant things:

First, it was the intention of the General Assembly to create a system of dealing with juveniles tailored specifically to their unique needs and situation. See G.S. 7A-516.

Second, under the new provisions, the juvenile court judge is relegated to committing juveniles to the Division of Youth Services for placement in training schools for an indefinite period (not exceeding the 18th birthday) except in very specific instances involving aggravating factors as described in G.S. 7A-652 (b)(2). Only in instances falling within the description of G.S. 7A-652(b)(2) may the judge commmit for a specific period of time.

Third, it would seem that the General Assembly desired that a juvenile not be deprived of his freedom for a longer period of time than the period to which an adult could have been sentenced if such adult had committed the same crime or crimes.

With regard to the first question posed, in similar situations involving criminal actions, it has long been held that:

"After a defendant, who did not appeal, has begun serving his sentence, a change or repeal of the law under which he was convicted does not affect his sentence absent a retrospective provision in the statute." State v. Pardon, 272 N.C. 72, 76 (1967).

If a criminal case is pending on appeal, of course, an amendment of the statute reducing the permissible punishment therefor inures to the benefit of the defendant. See State v. Spencer, 276

N.C. 535, 549 (1976); State v. Pardon, supra, at pp. 76-78.

While a juvenile proceeding is designedly different from a criminal action, nonetheless the same principals regarding retrospective application would appear to apply.

The second question posed appears to devolve from the fact that the duration of the sentence to confinement of an adult convicted of multiple offenses runs concurrently, as a matter of law, unless the trial judge directs otherwise. See State v. Effird, 271 N.C. 730 (1967); State v. Duncan, 208 N.C. 316 (1935). Normally, a statute depriving one of personal liberty (or smacking of criminal application) should be strictly interpreted. However, even a criminal statute must be interpreted so as to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. Further, ". . . an interpretation which leads to a strained construction or to a ridiculous result is not required and will not be adopted." State v. Spencer, supra, at p. 547 (1976).

It is significant that G.S. 7A-652(c) prohibits exceeding the period for which an adult could be committed, as distinguished from the period to which he would be committed. The obvious intendment was to look at the nature and separateness of the offenses involved as the criteria controlling the duration of commitment of a juvenile. This conclusion is further buttressed by consideration of the distinctive nature of the dispositional order ordinarily entered by a juvenile court judge (see G.S. 7A-651), as compared to the separate judgments involved in the sentences for individual, separate crimes entered in criminal cases involving adults. The very nature of the juvenile proceedings and the statutory basis therefor, preclude making the concurrent/consecutive sentencing procedure (which might have been used in a criminal case involving an adult) the controlling factor in determining the duration of the commitment of a juvenile.

Rufus L. Edmisten Attorney General

William F. O’Connell Special Deputy Attorney General