Education; Principals and Supervisors; Entitlement to Protections

Subject:

Education; Principals and Supervisors; Entitlement to Protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2)

Requested By:

Audrey Wagoner Division of Personnel Relations Department of Public Instruction

Question:

What requirements must be met by a principal or a supervisor in order to be entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2)?

Conclusion:

A principal must first attain the status of "career teacher" and thereafter serve for three consecutive years as the principal of an elementary school, junior high school or high school in order to be entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2). A supervisor must first attain the status of a "career teacher" and thereafter serve for three consecutive years as a supervisor performing a particular function in order to be entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2).

N.C.G.S. 115-142 sets forth the requirements which must be met by a public school teacher in order to attain "career teacher" status (a euphamism for tenure) and prescribes certain benefits and protections which flow from attainment of that status. Although tenure is generally not available to persons occupying administrative positions in educational institutions (see N.C.G.S. 115-142(c)(4) and the Code of the University of North Carolina), the General Assembly has elected to permit persons occupying the administrative positions of public school principal and supervisor to attain that status. The opinion of this Office has been requested as to the requirements which must be met by a principal and a supervisor in order to be entitled to this protected status.

The protection provided principals and supervisors and requirements which must be satisfied as a precondition to acquiring those protections are set forth in N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) which provides as follows:

"A career teacher who has performed the duties of a principal or supervisor in a particular position in the school system for three consecutive years shall not be transferred from that position to a lower paying non-administrative position without his consent except for the reasons in G.S. 115-142(e) and in accordance with the procedures for the dismissal of a career teacher set out in this section."

On the face of this statute, the requirements which must be met by a principal or a supervisor in order to be entitled to career status in such positions seem relatively clear, viz., that a person attain the status of a career teacher and then serve for three consecutive years as a principal or supervisor in a particular position. However, a closer examination of the wording of this subsection, particularly when reference is made to other parts of N.C.G.S. 115-142, raises questions as to the precise meaning and scope of these requirements.

When the language of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, reference must be made to the rules of statutory construction in order to ascertain the legislative will. Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E. 2d 797 (1948). The guiding principle in statutory construction is legislative intent and it is the intent which controls the interpretation of a statute. State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213

S.E. 2d 291 (1975).

N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2), reasonable read, requires a principal or supervisor, as a first step in securing the protections afforded by that subsection, to attain the status of a "career teacher". The phrase "career teacher" is defined in N.C.G.S. 115-142(a)(3) as a "a teacher who has obtained career status as provided in G.S. 115-142(c)." "Career teacher" status is acquired when "a teacher" is employed by a school system for three consecutive years and then re-employed for a fourth year. N.C.G.S. 115-142(c(2). "Teacher" is defined by N.C.G.S. 115-142(a)(9) as follows:

""Teacher" means a person who holds at least a current, not expired, Class A certificate or a regular, not provisional or expired vocational certificate issued by the State Department of Public Instruction; whose major responsibility is to teach or directly supervise teaching or who is classified by the State Board of Education or is paid as a classroom teacher; and who is employed in a full-time permanent position."

This definition would include a supervisor but may not include a principal for it is doubtful that the "major responsibility" of a principal is to "directly supervise teaching" and principals are paid and classified on a different basis than are classroom teachers. See 16 N.C.A.C. 3.0414 and 16

N.C.A.C. 3.0417. If a principal is not a "teacher" as that term is defined in N.C.G.S. 115-142 then a principal who has never taught school or who has not taught a sufficient number of years to acquire "career teacher" status could never enjoy the protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2). Such a reading would result in the anomalous situation of supervisors but only some principals being eligible for the protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2). We think of no rational reason for distinguishing between principals on the basis of the fortuitous circumstance of opportunity to teach. Any such reading of a statute is disfavored. State v. Hart, supra; Little v. Stevens, 267 N.C. 328, 148 S.E. 2d 201.

This undesirable and unfair reading of N.C.G.S. 115-142 may be avoided on either one of two grounds – (1) by interpreting the phrase "career teacher" appearing in N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) as meaningless or (2) by interpreting the term "teacher" as defined in N.C.G.S. 115-142(a)(9), as including principals within its meaning. In the opinion of this Office, it is this latter approach which is most proper. To construe the phrase "career teacher" as meaningless is at variance with established rules of statutory construction. The courts of this state have held that the words of a statute may not be ignored and that the legislature will be presumed to have inserted every part of a statute for a purpose. State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 212 S.E. 2d 113 (1975); Nance v. Southern Railroad, 149 N.C. 366, 63 S.E. 116 (1908). On the other hand, the rules of the statutory construction do permit N.C.G.S. 115-142(a)(9) to be read to include princpals. It was obviously the intent of the General Assembly in enacting N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) to provide some sort of job security and protection to school principals and supervisors. When a literal reading of a statute (here (N.C.G.S. 115-142(a)(9)) will contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature as otherwise expressed (here in N.C.G.S. 115-142(d))2)), the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded. Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N.C. 488, 212 S.E. 2d 381 (1975).

To summarize to this point, the first requirement imposed upon principals and supervisors by

N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) in order to obtain the statutory protections provided therein is to acquire the status of a "career teacher". In order to acquire "career teacher" status, a person must serve in a position which falls within the meaning of the term "teacher" as defined in N.C.G.S. 115-142(a)(9) for a period of three years and be re-employed for a fourth year. Among the positions which fall within the meaning of the term "teacher" are the positions of supervisor and principal.

Once a principal or supervisor has acquired "career teacher" status, the principal or supervisor is required by N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) to thereafter serve as a principal or supervisor "in a particular position in the school system for three consecutive years" in order to be entitled to the protections provided therein. In other words, a minimum of six (6) years experience is required for a principal or supervisor to be entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2).

Once a principal or supervisor has acquired the status of a "career teacher", however, N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) is unclear as to where the next three years service as a principal or supervisor must be performed. The phrase "in a particular position" is ambiguous and susceptible of several interpretations, particularly in regard to principals. It could mean that a principal must serve as a principal of a particular school for three consecutive years; could mean that a principal must serve as a principal at a particular level of the school system (elementary, junior high or high school) for three consecutive years; could mean that a principal must serve at a particular size school (principals are paid on this basis) for three consecutive years; or could be considered redundant.

To construe the phrase "in a particular position" as redundant, and thus meaningless, would violate the rules of statutory construction as set forth in Nance v. Southern Railroad, supra and State v. Williams, supra. The choice between the other possible constructions of this phrase, however, is not as clear. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be constructed to effectuate legislative purpose and intent. State v. Hart, supra. The implicit but nevertheless manifest purpose of the General Assembly in providing for a probationary period of employment prior to the award of career status (which in most circumstances means, in practical terms, the award of a lifetime contract) is to assure that local boards of education have an adequate and reasonable opportunity to observe and evaluate the performance of individuals in their work in order that only persons with demonstrated abilities to perform their assigned duties are awarded this exceptional status. Because of the exceptional nature of this status and the consequences which flow from its award, statutory requirements for tenure status should be strictly construed. Marzec v. Fremont School Dist., 142 Colo. 83, 349 P. 2d 699 (1960); Anderson v. Bd. of Education, 390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E. 2d 562 (1945); O’Connor v. Emerson, 188 N.Y.S. 236, aff’d. 232 N.Y. 551, 134 N.E. 572 (1911).

We acknowledge that the question of the precise meaning of the phrase "in a particular position”
is a close one, particularly in regard to principals. It is the opinion of this Office, however, that
the legislative intent in establishing a probationary period for principals and supervisors prior to
gaining the protections set forth in N.C.G.S. 115-142(d)(2) is best and most reasonably
effectuated by interpreting this phrase to mean that a principal serve at the elementary school
level, junior high school level or high school level, and for a supervisor the performance of a
particular function (e.g., elementary school curriculum supervisor). The most important duties of
a principal are the implementation of the school curriculum, evaluation of teachers and the
maintenance of discipline. But schools are not fungible; nor are the skills and abilities necessary
to perform these duties in an effective manner. The effectiveness of a principal in performing his
duties is dependent in some way on the size of the school to which he is assigned. Likewise, the
effectiveness of a person as an elementary school principal may vary to some extent depending
upon the type elementary school to which he is assigned. Clearly, however, the skills and abilities
necessary to function effectively as a principal of an elementary school as compared with a high
school differ markedly. There is substantial variation among the curricula at an elementary
school, junior high school and high school; the skills and abilities necessary for effective
teaching, which must be evaluated by principals, vary from one level of the school system to
another; and disciplinary problems increase with each progression in grade level.

Interpreting the phrase "in a particular position" to mean for principals service at the elementary
school level, the junior high school or the high school level, in our opinion, best reflects the
practical and substantial distinctions which exist among the duties and responsibilities of
principals at various levels of the public school system and recognizes the differing skills and
abilities necessary to function effectively under those circumstances. Thereby, the legislative
intent in establishing a probationary period for principals and supervisors in order to provide
local boards of education with an adequate and reasonable opportunity to determine the
effectiveness of persons as principals and supervisors in the performance of their particular (and
different) duties and responsibilities is preserved. "(T)he intention of the Legislature constitutes
the law." State v. Hart, supra, 287 N.C. at 80.

Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General

Edwin M. Speas, Jr.
Special Deputy Attorney General