Adoption, Child Placement

Subject:

Adoption, Child Placement

Requested By:

James B. Wood President Johnston Memorial Hospital

Question:

Does N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.7 prohibit a hospital from delivering new-born babies to adoptive parents?

Conclusion:

No.

Natural mothers, who have arranged a private adoption for their babies, occasionally request that they not have any contact with their newborn children and that the children be delivered directly to the adoptive parents. Adoptive Services of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources has interpreted N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.7 to prohibit the physical transfer of an infant to adoptive parents even upon request of the natural mother. Johnston Memorial Hospital has requested a ruling on this question and Adoptive Services, acknowledging that this is a common concern and inquiry, concurs in the request for an opinion.

N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.7 is part of Chapter 131D, Inspection and Licensing of Facilities, and reads as follows:

§ 131D-10.7. Penalties.

Any person who establishes or provides foster care for children or who receives and places children in residential child-care facilities, family foster homes or adoptive homes without a license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punishable by a fine of not more than fifty dollars ($50.00) for the first offense and not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each subsequent offense.

The statute is found within Article 1A (Control over Child Placing and Child Care) which pertains to licensing of foster care and child care facilities and of child placing agencies. The phrase receives and places is not defined in N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.2. The phrase child-placing agency is defined as "a person authorized by statute or license under this Article to receive children for purposes of placement in . . . adoptive homes." N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.2(4).

Reading the statute in the context of the chapter on licensing and inspection of child placing agencies leads to the conclusion that N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.7 was not intended to address the situation in which a hospital employee, with no involvement in the arrangement of adoption, simply delivers an infant to adoptive parents. In addition, the language "in . . . adoptive homes" goes beyond what a hospital employee does when he releases a newborn child to an adoptive parent.

N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.7 must also be read in conjunction with Chapter 48 of the General Statutes which, among other things, prescribes procedures for adoptions. Although the chapter does not answer the specific question addressed by this opinion, it is clear that placement for adoption has a much broader meaning than mere physical receipt or placement. See, e.g., the definition of "licensed child-placing agency" which speaks of placement "for adoption." N.C.G.S. § 48-2(4). The words place or placement when used in the context of adoptions refer to greater involvement in the adoption process than the physical delivery of a child to his adoptive parents. The very statement of the question of whether a hospital employee may deliver an infant to adoptive parents presupposes compliance of the adoptive parents with the procedures of Chapter 48 and implies that the physical delivery of the child occurs after the child has already been "placed" for adoption. The delivery, therefore, could not constitute placement.

Consequently, a hospital’s discharge of an infant to adoptive parents does not constitute a violation of N.C.G.S. § 131D-10.7. To conclude otherwise would violate the principle of statutory construction that statutes are normally interpreted in a manner that will avoid absurd consequences. Commissioner of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 239 S.E.2d 48 (1978).

LACY H. THORNBURG Attorney General

Elizabeth G. McCrodden Assistant Attorney General