Juveniles; Use of Juvenile Detention Home; Holdover Facility

Subject:

Juveniles; Use of Juvenile Detention Home; Holdover Facility.

Requested By:

Herb Stout Chairman Governor’s Advocacy Council on Children and Youth

Questions:

1. If a county has a written agreement to use a juvenile detention facility in another count, is that considered "available" if it does have space available on a given date?

2. If a county with an agreement to use another county’s juvenile detention facility instead chooses to detain a juvenile in its own adult jail, although the juvenile detention facility has space available, what is the penalty?

3. If a county holds a juvenile in an adult jail on or after July 1, 1983, what is the penalty?

Conclusions:

1. The question of whether a detention home is available is a factual determination made by the judge in a secure custody hearing. In reaching his determination, several factors may be assessed including, but not limited to:

a.

the existence of unused space within a detention home; and

b.

problems arising from distances between detention homes and counties.

2. and 3. Inasmuch as the determination of the availability of a detention home is made by the judge in a secure custody hearing, the principle of judicial immunity bars liability against the judge where he determines that secure custody should be effectuated in a holdover facility.

At the outset, it must be noted that statutory authority to issue an order for secure custody is vested in the judge presiding over the juvenile delinquency proceeding. G.S. 7A-573; 7A574(b)(c) and (d); 7A-575; 7A-576; 7A-577. A fortiori the judge determines where secure custody will be effectuated. Thus, the question of whether a detention home is available is a factual determination falling within the sound discretion of the judge on an ad hoc basis, meaning that the decision reached in any given case will ultimately depend upon the particular facts presented.

Certain terms appearing in G.S. 7A-576(b) and (c) are defined by statute. A review of their statutory definitions is helpful in understanding the provisions of G.S. 7A-576(b) and (c). Specifically, the following statutes are instructive:

(a)

G.S. 7A-517(15) defines the term "detention home" as (a)n authorized facility providing secure custody for juveniles."

(b)

G.S. & A-517(15) defines the words "holdover facility" as "(a) place in a jail which has been approved by the Department of Human Resources as meeting the State standards for detention as required in G.S. 153A-221 providing close supervision where the juvenile cannot converse with, see, or be seen by the adult population."

(c)

G.S. 7A-517(26) defines the words "regional detention home" as "(a) state-supported and administered regional facility providing care."

G.S. 7A-576(b) and (c) read:

"(b) A juvenile meeting the criteria set out in G.S. 7A-574(b) may be temporarily detained in an approved county detention home or a regional detention facility which shall be separate from any jail, lockup, prison, or other adult penal institution. It shall be unlawful for a county or any unit of government to operate a juvenile detention home unless the facility meets the standards promulgated by the Department of Human Resources.

(c) Until July 1, 1983, if no juvenile detention home is available, a juvenile meeting the criteria set out in G.S. 7A-574(b) may be detained in a holdover facility which shall be inspected pursuant to G.S. 108-79 through 108-81, and 153A-222, and shall meet the State standards provided for in G.S. 153A-221."

The fundamental issue raised by Subsection (c) involves ascertaining what is meant by the phrase "if no juvenile detention home is available." Crucial to this issue is the meaning of the word "available," which is not defined by statute. In analyzing this issue, reliance is placed on general principles of statutory construction. Firmly entrenched in this jurisprudence is the principle that when construing a statute the words used therein will be given their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context that they should be taken in a different sense. LaFayette Transportation Service v. County, 283 N.C. 494, 196 S.E. 2d 770 (1973). A court may resort to dictionaries for assistance in ascertaining the common and ordinary meaning of words and phrases. State v. Ludlum, 303 N.C. 666, 281 S.E. 2d 159 (1981). Further, as stated in Realty Corp. v. Bd. of Transportation, 303 N.C. 434, 279 S.E. 2d 826 (1981):

"It is well-established that the intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. E.g., State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E. 2d 291 (1975); State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126, 179 S.E. 2d 371 (1971); Underwood v. Howland, 274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E. 2d (1968). Statutes which deal with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, e.g., Shaw v. Baxley, 270 N.C. 740, 155 S.E.2d 256 (1967); Becker County Sand and Gravel Co. v. Taylor, 269 N.C. 617, 153 S.E. 2d 19 (1967); Hobbs v. County of Moore, 267 N.C. 665, 149 S.E. 2d 1 (1966), and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each. E.G., Jackson v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 166, 155 S.E. 2d 78 (1969)."

Id. at 434, 279 S.E. 2d at 832.

Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (1976) defines the word "available" as follows:

". . . 1. that one can avail himself of; that can be used; unable 2. that can be got, had, or reached; hand; accessible. . . ."

In view of this definition, the existence of unused space in a detention home is a factor which should be considered in determining whether such home is available for secure custody. For example, where evidence in a secure custody hearing tends to show that a detention home is operating at its maximum capacity in terms of juveniles placed therein, it is clearly apparent that a holdover facility may be used for secure custody. However, from reading the definition of the word "available" and G.S. 134A-37(1), it is also apparent that in addition to space other factors bearing on the availability of a detention home might be shown by the evidence.

G.S. 134A-37 provides:

"The Department (of Human Resources) shall be responsible for juvenile detention services, including the development of a statewide plan for regional juvenile detention services as recommended by (the Report of the National Juvenile Detention Association entitled Juvenile Detention in North Carolina: A Study Report, released in January, 1973) which will offer juvenile detention care of sufficient quality to meet State standards to any child requiring juvenile detention care within the State in a county detention home or a regional detention home by January 1, 1979, as follows:

1) The Department shall plan with the counties operating a county detention home to provide regional juvenile detention services to surrounding counties as recommended by said report, except that the Department shall have some discretion in defining the geographical boundaries of the regions based on negotiations with affected counties, distances, availability of juvenile detention care that meets State standards, and other appropriate variable factors.

(2) The Department shall plan for and administer five or more regional detention homes as recommended in said report, including careful planning on location, architectual design, construction, and administration of a program to meet the needs of children in juvenile detention care. Both the physical facility and the program of a regional detention home shall comply with State standards." (Emphasis added)

The statute shows that the following factors may affect the resolution of the issue of whether a "detention home is available": (a) the distance between the detention home and the court having jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding; (b) whether the detention home meets certain State standards; and (c) "and other appropriate variable factors" including, but not limited to, the receipt of appropriate funding for juvenile detention services.

Currently, there are eight secure detention facilities for juveniles operating in the State. Five facilities are regional detention facilities operating under a State Detention Subsidy Program pursuant to G.S. 134A-38; one is a State operated regional detention facility; and the remaining two facilities are locally funded and operated, providing services to a limited number of surrounding counties under local agreements. While these facilities are designed to serve specific geographical areas in the State, it might be shown that significant problems exist in seeking access to such facilities, even if there is unused space therein.

Evidence at a secure custody hearing may tend to tip the scale against utilization of a detention home. Conceivably, evidence might tend to show, inter alia, that because of the distance between the county and the detention home, and the county is faced with major logistical and fiscal problems in transporting a juvenile; that distance adversely affects the ability of the juvenile’s attorney to afford him effective representation; and that distance severely curtails visits to a juvenile by his family or others involved in the delinquency proceeding. Indeed, evidence tending to show the above considerations may be decisive in a particular case.

In conclusion, it is the Opinion of this Office that the General Assembly intended that several factors be considered in determining whether a "detention home is available." The factors would not only include those referred to herein but others dictated by a common sense assessment of the particular circumstances of each case. It is further noted that, in the final analysis, this issue must be resolved in the sound discretion of the judge in each case.

Turning to the second and third questions presented herein, a combined anaylsis is appropriate because of their similarity. As stated above, the judge determines whether a detention home is available in each case. Accordingly, the appropriate issue involves ascertaining what penalty may be assessed against the judge, especially where he orders that secure custody be effectuated in a holder facility.

Initially, we hope that a judge will not violate a clear mandate of the law. However, if a judge issues an order which is contrary to the law, it is unlikely that he will be held liable for such action.

It is well settled that a judge is not subject to civil actions for errors committed in discharging his official duties. Fuquay Springs v. Rowland, 239 N.C. 299, 79 S.E. 2d 774 (1954). More recently, Judge Clark, writing for the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Jacobs v. Sherard, 36 N.C.App. 60, 243 S.E.2d 184, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 466, 246 S.E. 2d 12 (1978), made the following comments:

"Judges and judicial officers have always been awarded "absolute" immunity for their judicial acts. Absolute immunity covers even conduct which is corrupt, malicious or intended to do injury." (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 64, 243 S.E.2d at 188.

The rationale underlying the principle of judicial immunity was succinctly stated as follows by the United States Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed. 2d 288 (1967):

"This immunity . . . is . . . "for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, (13 Wall. 335), 349, note at 350.)"

Id. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218, 18 L.Ed. 2d. at 294.

Applying this principle as articulated in the above authorities, the conclusion is inescapable that a judge is immune from liability relating to, inter alia, his decision to place a juvenile in a holdover facility.

This conclusion should not be construed, however, as barring a civil action for damages against individuals who are alleged to have deliberately and intentionally misrepresented evidence regarding the availability of a detention home, causing the juvenile to be place and injured in a holdover facility. Liability, if any, against such individuals would depend upon the particular merits of the case.

Rufus L. Edmisten Attorney General

Reginald L. Watkins Assistant Attorney General