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Counties; Department of Human Resources; Aid to the Needy Blind

January 28, 1980

Subject:

Counties; Department of Human Resources; Aid to the Needy Blind; G.S. 111-13 through G.S.

Requested By:

L. Earl Jennings, Jr. Director Division of Services for the Blind Department of Human Resources

Question:

Under the provisions of G.S. 111-13 through G.S. 111-20, what is the requirement upon the Department of Human Resources and the individual counties with respect to accepting all cases involving applicants for special assistance to the blind, in which the applicants fully satisfy the eligibility requirements, regardless of the amount of funds appropriated for that purpose?

Conclusion:

The requirement upon the Department of Human Resources and the Boards of County Commissioners of the individual counties to accept all duly qualified and otherwise eligible applicants for special assistance to the blind remains the same and is not reduced or limited by the amount of funds appropriated by a county or by the General Assembly for the specific purpose.

The program for Aid to the Needy Blind mandated by G.S. 111-13 through G.S. 111-20 is a State program. The Department of Human Resources is charged with the supervision of its administration (G.S. 111-13) and with making the payments to persons qualifying for awards thereunder (G.S. 111-18). Once a state elects to establish a program for public assistance, it must meet constitutional standards and may not arbitrarily deny to a portion of its citizens the benefits of such program. Sherbert v. Verner, 274 U.S. 398, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965. An applicant who is fully qualified and eligible must be granted suitable relief under the applicable laws and regulations. For a board of county commissioners or the Department of Human Resources to deny that relief because of the inadequacy of current county and/or State appropriations would constitute a violation of that applicant’s constitutional right to equal protection of law.

We realize, of course, that public officials may not be required to do impossible acts such as the payment of awards where the absolute unavailability of funds would make payment of the total of such awards an impossibility. However, the pertinent statutes do not make the payment of these awards contingent upon whether the county of residence of the recipient has made timely payment of the full amount of its share of such relief granted in that county as required by G.S. 111-17. That section provides that such award shall be paid from county, State and federal funds available. (This Opinion does not attempt to deal with the hypothetical situation where adequate funds for the full payment of all awards cannot be made available to the Department of Human Resources.)

Nothing theretofore said implies an opinion by this Office that the several counties are excused from payment of their share of the total amount of relief granted to blind applicants. G.S. 111-17 requires that a county’s share of such be transmitted to the State Treasurer in equal monthly installments. It permits counties to borrow within constitutional limitations, to make up any deficiency in its share caused by insufficiency of its appropriation. We believe that G.S. 111-17 imposes an obligation of the highest priority upon the several counties to use all lawful means to pay their share of the total relief granted in a timely manner. In the event it becomes absolutely impossible for a county to pay its full share of such assistance during a given fiscal year, the resulting deficiency remains a portion of the county’s share to be provided for in its next appropriation and tax levy, pursuant to G.S. 111-17. Failure of a county to so provide would subject it to the sanction of that Section including the mandatory withholding of allocation of funds by the Department of Human Resources.

It is recognized that the provisions of G.S. 111-17 permitting a county to borrow to meet its part of the amount required for such aid may currently be rendered ineffective by the statutory limitation upon interest which may be paid.

Rufus L. Edmisten Attorney General

William F. Briley Assistant Attorney General