October 10, 1983
Subject:
Health, Certificates of Need for Life Care Centers
Requested By:
Sarah T. Morrow, M.D., M.P.H., Secretary Department of Human Resources
Question:
Does Chapter 920 of the 1983 Session Laws allow qualifying "Life Care" institutions to obtain a Certificate of Need for construction of nursing home beds?
Conclusion:
Yes.
North Carolina’s Certificate of Need Law, G.S. 131-175 et seq., n1 provides that no person may offer or develop a new institutional health service without first obtaining a certificate of need from the Department of Human Resources. G.S. 131-178(a). The addition or construction of skilled nursing care or intermediate care beds (commonly and hereinafter referred to as nursing home beds) is generally a new institutional health service. See G.S. 131-176(17).
n1 To be recodified at G.S. 131E-175 et seq. effective January 1, 1984. 1983 Session Laws, c. 775.
Section 31 of Chapter 1127 of the 1981 Session Laws ("section 31") prohibits the Department from issuing certificates of need for new or additional nursing home beds until all previously approved nursing home beds have been constructed and until such beds are occupied at a 75% rate. However, subsection 31(f) exempted from that prohibition the issuance of certificates of need to life care centers, as defined by G.S. 131A-3 of the Health Care Facilities Finance Act, for the conversion of home for the aged beds to nursing home beds if it is done in accordance with the policy set forth in the State Medical Facilities Plan.
As a result of the foregoing, a life care center could receive a certificate of need for the conversion of home for the aged beds to nursing home beds, but not for the construction of nursing home beds.
The 1983 General Assembly ratified House Bill 779 entitled "An Act to Modify the Certificate of Need Law for Life Care Centers" as Chapter 920 of the Session Laws of 1983 ("Chapter 920"). Section 1 of that act reads:
Section 31(f) of Chapter 1127, Session Laws of 1981 and any similar provision which may be enacted by the General Assembly of 1983 do not apply to the construction of skilled nursing facilities or intermediate care facilities as a part of a "life care" or "care for life" institution as defined in G.S. 131A-3(11). n2
n2 Chapter 655, s. 3 of the Session Laws of 1983 provides that section 31 shall remain effective until July 31, 1983.
Chapter 761, s. 74 of the Session Laws of 1983 amended section 31 by adding a subsection (g) which reads: "This section shall expire June 30, 1985."
Section 2 amends G.S. 131-181 by adding a new subsection (c) on evaluating the need for nursing home beds in life care institutions. Section 3 sets forth the qualifications a life care center must meet to be covered by the Act and further provides:
No certificate of need may be granted under this act after June 30, 1984.
Section 4 provides that the act, with the exception of one provision, is effective upon ratification.
In interpreting statutes, the controlling factor is the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 389 (1978). Among the indicia from which the legislative intent is to be ascertained are the purposes of the act, the legislative history, the circumstances surrounding adoption, and the title of the Act. Matter of Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1978).
In addition, "it is a well settled rule of statutory construction that, where a literal interpretation of the language would contravene the manifest purpose of the statute, the reason and purpose of the law will be given effect and the strict letter thereof disregarded." Banks, 295 N.C. at 240, 244 S.E.2d at 389. "Where possible "the language of a statute will be interpreted so as to avoid an absurd consequence. . . ."" Id. quoting Hobbs v. Moore County, 267 N.C. 665, 671, 149 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1966). To this end, the North Carolina courts have long held that clerical errors will be corrected in interpreting statutes. Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 331, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982); State v. Daniels, 244 N.C. 671, 673, 94 S.E.2d 799 (1956); State v. Sizemore, 199
N.C. 687, 689-90, 155 S.E. 724, (1930); Tommey v. Goldsboro Lumber Company, 171 N.C. 178, 180-82, 88 S.E. 215 (1916).
Applying the above principles to Chapter 920 leads to the conclusion that the reference in section 1 to section 31(f) is a clerical error and should be interpreted to mean section 31. Otherwise, the prohibition against the issuance of certificates of need to life care centers for the construction of nursing home beds will remain in effect. Such a result would contravene the purpose of the statute.
Without the correction, the language in section 1 of Chapter 920 has no effect. Section 1 applies only to the construction of nursing home beds by life care centers. The exemption provided by section 31(f) applies only to the conversion by life care centers of home for the aged beds to nursing home beds. Thus, section s1(f) never has applied to the subject matter of section 1 of Chapter 920.However, section 31, by prohibiting the issuance of certificates of need for new or additional nursing homes, except as otherwise provided therein, does apply to the construction of nursing home beds by life care centers. The correct reference is therefore to section 31.
Additional evidence of clerical error is found in section 3 of Chapter 920. As noted previously, that section provides that no certificate of need may be issued under Chapter 920 after June 30, 1984.The prohibition of section 31 remains in effect until June 30, 1985. Thus, unless section 1 of Chapter 920 is corrected so that the prohibition is lifted, the cited language of section 3 has no effect.
Finally, an earlier version of House Bill 779 reveals that the General Assembly intended to lift the prohibition. In the April 12, 1983 version of House Bill 779, section 1 reads:
Section 31(f) of Chapter 1127, Session Laws of 1981, is amended by adding the following to the end:
"This section does not apply to construction of nursing home beds at a life care center as defined in G.S. 131A-3(11)."
This version had the effect of explicitly exempting life care centers from the prohibition of section 31.
For the reasons set forth above, it is our opinion that the reference in section 1 of Chapter 920 to section 31(f) is a clerical mistake and should be read to mean section 31. Thus, qualifying life care centers may be eligible to receive a certificate of need for the construction of nursing home beds.
RUFUS L. EDMISTEN ATTORNEY GENERAL
William F. Briley Assistant Attorney General