Skip Navigation
  • Robocall Hotline:(844)-8-NO-ROBO
  • All Other Complaints:(877)-5-NO-SCAM
  • Outside NC:919-716-6000
  • En Español:919-716-0058

Social Services; Child Support; International Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Obligations

July 31, 1979

Subject:

Social Services; Child Support; International Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Obligations

Requested By:

Robert H. Ward, Director Social Services Division Department of Human Resources

Question:

Is the Nation of West Germany a foreign jurisdiction which has a substantially similar support law such that reciprocal enforcement may be effectuated under the North Carolina uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act (N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32)?

Conclusion:

Yes.

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter referred to as URESA) is codified in the North Carolina General Statutes under Chapter 52A. As stated in 52A-2, the purposes of the Chapter "are" to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto."

It is clear that URESA is a uniform law, reciprocal in nature and purpose and should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to accomplish and enforce the duty of a parent to support his children. Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976).

The purpose of URESA is to provide a prompt expeditious way of enforcing the duty to support minor children without getting the parties involved in complex collateral issues. Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974).

URESA was designed to provide commercial and expedient means of enforcing support orders for parties who are located in different states or jurisdictions. Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976).

From the very onset of its first adoption in the early fifties, it has been clear that URESA has been a success and the various states have adopted it, as well as its amendments, quite readily. The act seeks to apply an equitable and expeditious method of dealing with the complex problems involved. As stated in the Family Law Reporter, 4 FLR 4017, May 2, 1978:

"URESA was a recognition by the states that problems of child and spousal support were no longer a purely local concern. Conventional judicial proceedings were simply unsuitable for effective enforcement of support orders because the absent spouse was normally outside the jurisdiction of the dependent’s state courts, because the stay-at-home spouse could rarely afford to track down and sue the absent spouse in another jurisdiction, and because the federal courts have traditionally been closed to domestic relations actions. . . . URESA is an attempt to provide a consistent statutory mechanism for the interstate, and occasionally international, enforcement of support decrees without forcing the person seeking support to bring the action in the absent spouse’s jurisdiction. . . . Even though the typical URESA proceeding involves an obligee in one state and an obligor in another state, the act’s mechanism may also be used within a state on a county-to-county basis, and is occasionally used in support enforcement cases which cross national boundaries." (P. 4017)

In conference at the September, 1967, meeting of the National Conference on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the central committee decided that it would be far more desirable to have state action on reciprocity with foreign jurisdictions than to seek federal involvement. Basically, this was due to the belief that the federal government would be reluctant to delve into matters relating to family law coupled with the additional problem as to which federal agency could properly and effectively represent the various states. Thus it was left to the individual states to broaden the definition in their statutes to include foreign nationals. This was accomplished by a re-examination of the statutory definitions of URESA.

As a result, in 1968 URESA was rewritten such that the definition of "State" in the revised resion of URESA (called RURESA) was expanded to include "any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is an effect."

In 1971, the Council of State Governments on completion of a study of URESA found that nineteen states had provisions in their acts which permitted reciprocity with other nations. North Carolina was not among those enumerated. In this regard, it is noted that North Carolina General Statute 52A-3(8) in 1971 provided that a "State" included "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and District of Columbia, in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted." Therefore, it is clear that prior to 1975, the North Carolina definition of "State" excluded anything other than a state, territory, or possession of the United States in which a reciprocal law was in effect.

In order to correct the limited scope of the statute and to broaden the definition of "State", in 1975 the statute was amended so that the definition of "State" now includes any "state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action, and any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect." See N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13).

Obviously, the North Carolina Legislature intended that the statute as amended should include foreign nations which have a substantially similar reciprocal law within the scope of URESA. Proceeding under the new amendments, North Carolina has recently begun to enforce support laws with Ontario, Canada and thus support duties are now being enforced on behalf of North Carolina residents against residents of Ontario, and vice versa. The amendment made in 1975 clearly evidences legislative intent that the same procedure is permissible with other foreign nations.

It should be noted that the objection to reciprocity with a foreign nation on the grounds that international enforcement violates the constitutional prohibition against individual states entering into treaties with foreign governments has been considered and rejected in at least one case. See Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415, D.N.Y.; aff’d 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973). In Blouin, supra, the Court held that the statute has reciprocal effect and grants to the foreign jurisdiction the same procedural remedies in New York Courts as the foreign state grants to our citizens. The Court further held that it was not a compact with a foreign government, nor did the statute disrupt or embarrass our relations with other countries. Pp. 417-418.

A review of the law of West Germany reveals that the support laws there are substantially similar to those which exist in North Carolina and, in fact, often are broader than our own. For example, the obligation to support includes legitimate and illegitimate children up until age eighteen. There is no statute of limitations for the establishment of paternity. The amount of support is determined by financial needs of the child and the ability of the parent to pay. Foreign orders establishing paternity and/or support are recognized and can be enforced in German courts or, if no judgment exists, a standard URESA petition may be sent to the German authorities who will seek to have a suitable order entered in Germany. Enforcement is through contempt proceedings similar to those followed in North Carolina. Thus, it is clear that the law of West Germany is "substantially similar" to our own.

In other states which have considered this problem, notably California and Oklahoma, we find that the term "State" is defined in the same manner as it is in North Carolina. Both Oklahoma and California have determined that West Germany is a reciprocating nation within the ambit of URESA and have granted reciprocity. Further, the West German Child Support authorities have indicated through correspondence that they are willing to reciprocate in the handling of support matters.

In summary, based on the history of URESA, the legislative intent as evidenced by recent amendments and actions by the various states which have considered this problem, it is apparent that our Chapter 52A intends that any foreign nation which has a substantially similar support law should be granted reciprocity and that West Germany falls within the statutory definition.

Rufus L. Edmisten Attorney General

Henry H. Burgwyn Associate Attorney