July 11, 1994
Mr. E. James Moore Forester Building 207 Tenth Street North Wilkesboro, N.C. 28659
Re: Advisory Opinion; Wilkes Regional Medical Center’s request for an Attorney General’s Opinion; N.C.G.S. § 131E-7(b).
Dear Mr. Moore:
You have asked whether N.C.G.S. § 131E-7(b) (1993) permits Wilkes Regional Medical Center ("Wilkes"), a municipal hospital, to hire salaried physicians, provide them with office space, office personnel, and appropriate medicines and supplies, and receive the income which these physicians generate from rendering medical services to members of the community.
As a municipal hospital, Wilkes has only those powers expressly delegated by statute and those necessarily implied by law and no other. See Keeter v. Lake Lure, 264 N.C. 252, 141 S.E.2d 634 (1965). Wilkes is authorized by implication to do an act if this act is "necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, or is essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects or purposes of the corporation." Green v. Kitchen, 229 N.C. 450, 454, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948).
Our research has revealed no statute which expressly states that a municipal hospital has the authority to hire salaried physicians. The issue is whether this authority may be necessarily or fairly implied in the power to contract as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 131E-7(b) (1993).
N.C.G.S. § 131E-7(b) (1993) provides:
A municipality or a public hospital may contract with or enter into any arrangement with other public hospitals or municipalities of this or other states, the State of North Carolina, federal, or public agencies, or with any person, private organization, or nonprofit corporation or association for the provision of healthcare. The municipality or public hospital may pay for or contribute its share of the cost of any such contract or arrangement from revenues available for these purposes, including revenues arising from the provision of health care.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and no different language will be interpolated or superimposed. See e.g., State ex rel. Utilities Com. v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451 (1977). Section 7(b) expressly permits a public hospital to contract with a person for the provision of healthcare. The cost of such a contract may be paid for from the revenues generated from the provision of the health care.
In our opinion, Section 7(b) gives Wilkes the authority to implement its proposal. The rendering of medical services by physicians falls within the plain and ordinary meaning of "the provision of health care." The act of hiring salaried physicians and furnishing them with office space, personnel and supplies falls within the ordinary meaning of "contract." The income generated from the physicians’ services would be the "revenue arising from the provision of healthcare."
Pursuant to Section 7(b), Wilkes may use this revenue to pay the physicians’ salaries. Therefore, based on the plain meaning of Section 7(b), we conclude that Wilkes’ proposal is permissble pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 131E-7(b) (1993).
Ann Reed Senior Deputy Attorney General
Lauren Murphy Clemmons
Associate Attorney General